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Abstract
With growing academic and policy interest in R&D tax incentives, the question
about their effectiveness has become ever more relevant. In the absence of an exoge-
nous policy reform, the simultaneous determination of companies’ tax positions and
their R&D spending causes an identification problem in evaluating tax incentives.
To overcome this problem, we exploit a UK policy reform and use the population
of corporation tax records that provide precise information on the amount of firm-
level R&D expenditure. Using difference-in-differences and other panel regression
approaches, we find a positive and significant impact of tax incentives on R&D
spending, and an implied user cost elasticity estimate of around -2.3. This trans-
lates to more than a pound in additional private R&D for each pound foregone in
corporation tax revenue.
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1 Introduction
Many governments use tax incentives to stimulate private expenditure on research and
development (R&D), including the majority of OECD countries and other large economies
such as China, India, Brazil and Russia.1 In the aftermath of the financial crisis, R&D
tax incentives have become more generous in many countries, in the hope of improving
competitiveness and stimulating long-run economic growth.
Despite the rising popularity of R&D tax incentives as a policy instrument, empirical
literature has not reached a consensus on their effectiveness in stimulating private R&D.
The main challenge, as described in Hall and Van Reenen (2000), is “...the intractability of
finding exogenous variation in the user cost of capital (p.450)”. This identification problem
of simultaneity between the user cost of capital and investment shocks arises both in the
context of incentives for physical investment and in R&D investment. There is, therefore,
a recent emphasis on evaluation of R&D policy based on evidence from quasi experiments,
which could use changes in the tax price of R&D that are exogenous to firm investment
decisions (for instance, Agrawal et al. (2014), Bronzini and Iachini (2014), Guceri (2015)).
In this paper, we provide new evidence on the causal effect of R&D tax incentives on
private R&D spending. We join a small number of recent studies that use a confidential
large-scale administrative dataset on corporation tax returns and R&D expenditures to
analyse the effect of R&D tax incentives in the United Kingdom.2 The R&D tax policy in
the UK is relatively simple – the tax benefits that we study are in the form of enhanced
deductions from the tax base and apply to the total amount of R&D every year for all
firms that carry out R&D activities. There are also two recent reforms in the UK R&D
tax policy, which introduced differential changes in the the R&D user cost of capital
for different groups of companies, allowing us to identify the causal effect of R&D tax
incentives by addressing the simultaneous determination of R&D spending and its tax
1OECD (2014) reports that in 2013, 27 of the 34 OECD Member States offered tax incentives for R&D.
2Recent work in this field include Rao (2014), Agrawal et al. (2014), Lokshin and Mohnen (2012) and
Mairesse and Mulkay (2013).
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price in a quasi-experimental setting.
During our sample period of 2002-2011, the UK’s R&D tax incentive scheme was in
the form of enhanced deductions of R&D spending from taxable income, with small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) enjoying a substantially more generous deduction rate
than large companies. The policy reform that we focus on is an expansion in the SME
definition that took effect in 2008, which doubled the thresholds measured in employment
size, turnover and total assets below which a company would be qualified as an SME. As
a result, a number of companies that would have been classified as large companies under
the old system became qualified as SMEs and were henceforth entitled to more generous
deduction rates. The reform resulted in differential changes in the user cost of R&D faced
by newly-classified SMEs compared to companies that remained as large, whose user cost
of R&D remained roughly stable in the years before and after the reform.
We analyse the effect of this reform by creating an administrative dataset that links
the population of corporation tax and R&D spending records in the UK. We further link
the tax record to the financial statement for each company and year for more information
on other contemporaneous, non-tax determinants of R&D investment such as firm size,
profitability and growth rate, which allows us to disentangle the true effect of the tax
incentive from other confounding factors.
The SME definition change was not the only reform that impacted the user cost of R&D
in 2008. There were additional increases in the R&D tax relief rates, which we exploit as
a separate experiment. We describe all the relevant policy reforms and the changes to the
statutory corporation rate which affect the user cost of R&D capital in detail in Section
2. Incorporating all these tax changes that took place in 2008, the overall reduction in
the tax component of the user cost of R&D capital amounts to 10-31 percent for a newly
classified SME, depending on the size and the precise tax position of the company. In our
data, companies in the treatment group experienced an average reduction in their user
cost of R&D by about 21 percent between 2007 and 2009. By comparison, the reform
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brought almost no change in the user cost of R&D capital for companies that remained
as large companies3.
We estimate the causal effect of the R&D tax relief on qualifying R&D expenditure
using a difference-in-difference (diff-in-diff) approach by exploiting the differential change
in the R&D tax incentives in 2008 between the treated and the control groups. The
key identifying assumption is that the changes in R&D over time follow parallel trends
for the treated and the control groups in the absence of a policy change. We present
results from regressions with placebo policy interventions in each of the pre-reform years
to demonstrate that we do not find significant ‘effects’ of any placebo reforms.
Our main finding suggests that companies in the treatment group on average increased
their R&D spending by about 39.7 percent in response to the increased generosity of tax
incentives in 2008. The positive and significant effect of the change in R&D tax incentive
is robust to controlling for aggregate macroeconomic shocks, other non-tax determinants
of R&D investment, and any potential anticipation effects of companies in response to
early announcement of the policy change.
Taking anticipation effects into consideration, the evidence from UK data supports
that tax incentives for R&D have a statistically significant, positive effect on the level of
R&D spending for companies that were actively performing qualifying R&D both before
and after the reform. Based on our difference-in-difference estimates, we can back out the
implied estimate for the elasticity of R&D spending with respect to its user cost, which is
around -2.34.
After presenting the analysis based on the SME definition change, we disentangle the
effect of the change in the deduction rate, thanks to the increased deduction rate for SMEs
relative to large companies. We use the same diff-in-diff estimation strategy to examine
the R&D investment response by companies that have remained as SMEs, comparing
3Due to the reduction in statutory tax rates and a 5 percentage point increase in the enhanced deduction
rate under the R&D tax relief which partly offset each other, the control group firms experienced a
reduction in their user cost of capital of 0.3 percent, which we consider to be negligible. We discuss these
policy changes in Section 2.
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them to companies that have remained as large in both pre- and post-reform periods.
The treated group of SMEs are not affected by the change in the SME definition, and
as a result the decrease in their tax price of R&D is entirely due to the increase in the
enhanced deduction rate from 150 to 175 percent. The regression results suggest a similar
elasticity estimate of the R&D spending with respect to the R&D user cost. On average,
SMEs (that remained SMEs in the post-reform period) increased their R&D spending by
about 16.4 percent, in response to a 9 percent decrease in the tax component of the user
cost, implying a R&D user cost elasticity of around -1.82. Similar to the findings from the
main experiment, the positive and significant effect of the change in R&D tax incentive is
robust to inclusion of additional controls and controlling for any potential strategic timing
of R&D spending in response to the early announcement of the rate increase. We present
additional evidence to show that companies do not systematically relabel their ordinary
investment expenditure as R&D spending to benefit from the larger tax deduction.
For each pound of foregone tax revenue, the qualifying R&D spending increases by
around £1.5 for a company paying at the ‘small profits’ rate of 21 percent, and by around
£1.1 for a company paying at the main rate of 28 percent.
The ultimate goal of promoting business R&D spending is to boost productivity. Hall
et al. (2010) gather examples from the vast empirical literature on the relationship between
productivity of R&D, with the main conclusion that companies’ spending in R&D have
strongly positive private returns (larger than the returns to physical capital). There are
additional spillover effects of R&D which benefit the society at large via its impact on
other firms and consumers. Our current analysis focuses on the increase in private R&D
spending thanks to the reduction in the tax price of this activity. The extent of the
productivity effects of the generated additional R&D remains to be an important area for
future research.
Our work is related to several strands of literature. First, our conceptual framework re-
lies on the analogy between investment in physical capital and knowledge capital (Griliches
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(1979)) within the neoclassical optimal capital accumulation framework in the spirit of
Jorgenson (1963) and Hall and Jorgenson (1967). Recent empirical evaluations of fiscal
incentives for physical investment include studies by Cummins et al. (1994), Caballero
et al. (1995), Chirinko et al. (1999), Edgerton (2010), Yagan (2015), Bond and Xing
(2015), and Zwick and Mahon (2014) which estimate the elasticity of physical capital with
respect to its user cost, as well as heterogeneities across firms in their responses to such
incentives.4 Second, our study links to the literature on the relationship between financing
constraints, R&D and innovation policy and productivity (Hall et al. (2010), Hall et al.
(2015), Bloom et al. (2002)). Third, as highlighted earlier, this paper relates to recent
studies on the effects of fiscal incentives for R&D using administrative data (Rao (2014)
and Agrawal et al. (2014)). Some other studies explore the effects of corporate taxation
on related outcomes such as patent location (Karkinsky and Riedel (2012), wages of R&D
employees (Lokshin and Mohnen (2013)) and new or improved products introduced to the
market (Czarnitzki et al. (2011)).
In the remainder of the paper, we first describe the policy set up in Section 2, followed
by a discussion of the conceptual framework for the mechanism through which tax incen-
tives increase R&D spending at the firm level (Section 3). Section 4 describes the data
sources and summarises the dataset used for the analysis. Section 6 explains the research
design and reports the main results. Section 7 concludes.
2 Policy background
The UK introduced its first R&D tax incentive scheme in 2000, in an effort to address its
‘productivity challenge’ – a term that features frequently in many government documents
and policy papers, referring to the UK private sector’s modest performance in total factor
productivity in comparison to other developed countries such as the United States (US),
4See Hassett and Hubbard (2002) for a recent survey on this topic.
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France and Germany.5
R&D policy in the UK currently relies heavily on tax incentives. According to the
OECD R&D tax incentive statistics6, about half of UK’s funding for business R&D was
channeled through tax incentives in 2012. Throughout our sample period of 2002-2011,
the R&D tax relief schemes were in the form of enhanced deductions. In 2000, the UK
R&D tax relief was introduced as a scheme targeted to SMEs, which were then defined
as companies with fewer than 250 employees, and either a balance sheet size of less than
e27 million or sales of less than e40 million7. In 2002, the scheme was extended to larger
firms, albeit at lower deduction rates.
Until 2008, the SME scheme allowed companies to tax deduct £150 for every £100 spent
on qualifying expenditures on R&D and the large company scheme allowed a deduction
of £125 for every £100. A cash credit was (and still is) available for SMEs which are in
a loss-making position and the amount of cash paid to such SMEs amounted up to 16
percent of the total surrenderable loss of the claimant 8. In April 2008, the large company
deduction rate increased from 125 to 130 percent and the SME deduction rate increased
from 150 to 175 percent. The SME deduction rate was further increased to 200 percent
in 2011. We present the relevant policy changes for our sample period in Figure 1.9
The tax price of R&D during this period was also affected by gradual changes in the
corporate tax rates summarised in Table 1. While the changes in the R&D enhanced
deduction rates and the rates of corporation tax alter the tax price of R&D spending,
the most dramatic reduction in the cost of marginal R&D investment for a group of firms
5See, for example, the Budget Report by HM Budget, 1999
6Available at http://www.oecd.org/sti/rd-tax-stats.htm
7The thresholds are defined in Euros as they are determined in accordance with the European Com-
mission’s definition of an SME due to the EU State Aid regulations. In 2005, the balance sheet size
threshold increased to e43 million and the turnover threshold increased to e50 million. Unlike the 2008
reform, the 2005 definition change applied to other tax allowances and benefits for SMEs in addition to
the R&D tax breaks, since it was a result of an EU-wide definition change.
8see Appendix B for the details on cash benefits for SMEs
9From 2013 onwards, an optional tax credit, which is directly deducted from the final tax liability of
companies and is itself taxable, was introduced for large companies at a rate equivalent to the enhanced
deduction rates (a taxable credit rate amounting to 10 percent of R&D expenditure). It was also an-
nounced that the large company scheme would completely switch to an above-the-line taxable credit from
April 2016 onwards, and loss-making large companies are now also eligible for cash refunds.
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Figure 1: Evolution of R&D tax relief deduction rates
Table 1: Marginal Corporation Tax Rate in the UK (percent), 2002-2014
[TABLE HERE]
was introduced with the August 2008 reform, which changed the definition of a small or
medium-sized enterprise (SME) used to determine eligibility for the more generous tax
treatment of R&D by doubling all the thresholds for defining an SME. We present the
pre-reform and the post-reform size thresholds in Figure 2.
Combining the effect of both the rate increases and the SME definition change, an
SME that was previously labeled as ‘large’ before the reform could deduct, for every £100
of qualifying R&D, £125 against its taxable profit in financial year 2007-08 and £175 in
2009-10. Newly-qualified SMEs also became eligible to claim cash if they incurred zero or
negative taxable profits in the current financial year.
Against the backdrop of all these tax-related reforms, the tax component of the user
cost of R&D evolved as depicted in Figure 3. We calculate the tax component of the user
cost as 1−A
1−τ , where A is the value of tax incentives (all tax credits and deductions) for
£1 spending in R&D and τ is the statutory tax rate. This formulation suggests that the
value of tax credits and allowances A be obtained by multiplying 1 + d, where d is the
deduction rate, by the statutory tax rate (for example, A = (1 + 0.5)τ for an SME in the
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Figure 2: Size thresholds for the SME tax relief
pre-2008 period). The distinction between corporation tax payments at the main rate or
the small profits rate applies to all the companies, independent of whether they perform
R&D or not, and the rate applicable to a certain company depends on its taxable profits
in a given year.
In Figure 3, a representative company that is eligible for the R&D tax relief for SMEs
throughout the sample period experiences a drop in its user cost due to the increase in
the deduction rate from 150 percent to 175 percent. The effect of the increase in the
deduction rate from 125 to 130 percent for large companies on R&D user cost is partly
offset by the decrease in the main statutory tax rate. The arrows indicate the transition
for a company that was labeled as ‘large’ before the SME definition change and as ‘SME’
after this reform. A representative company that benefited from the definition change
experienced a decrease in the R&D user cost by around 21 percent between 2007 and 2009
if paying at the small profits rate, and around 15 percent if paying at the main rate.
3 Conceptual framework
Based primarily on the neoclassical optimal capital accumulation framework presented
in Hall and Jorgenson (1967) and Jorgenson (1963), and treating investment in R&D anal-
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Figure 3: Tax component of the user cost of R&D on current spending
ogously to investment in physical capital, we may consider a simple conceptual background
for the response of firms to R&D tax incentives. Bond and Van Reenen (2007) review the
literature on investment models of this type, and the notations here follow the convention
adopted in their chapter.
We consider a Cobb-Douglas production function with R&D capital as the sole input10.
Firms maximise the net present shareholder value subject to the law of motion for the
accumulation of R&D capital. For each firm, the production function is:
F (Kt) = AK
α
t (1)
The firms’ optimisation problem is:
Vt(Kt−1) =max
Rt
{Πt(Kt) + βt+1Et(Vt+1(Kt))} (2)
subject to Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1 +Rt (3)
10Bloom et al. (2002), Mairesse and Mulkay (2013) provide applications with constant elasticity of
substitution production functions in the R&D context.
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where δ is the depreciation rate and Vt is the maximised current value of the firm as a
function of the knowledge capital accumulated in the firm denoted by Kt−1. Knowledge
accumulates according to the law of motion expressed in Equation 3, with knowledge
capital in time period t determined by the previous period’s capital, net of depreciation,
plus investment in new R&D, Rt. βt+1 =
1
1+rt+1
is the rate at which the firm discounts
future revenue, with rt+1 being the risk free interest rate representing the outside option
of the firm.
Several simplifications are made in the derivations that follow. We assume no depreci-
ation, and no adjustment costs for simplicity, and the firm finances all R&D by retained
earnings. In addition, we assume price-taking firms in both the markets for their input
and their output. In the presence of taxes, the current revenue of the firm is:
Πt(Kt, Rt) = (1− τ)[ptF (Kt)− pKt Rt] + cpKt Rt (4)
where τ is the corporation tax rate applied to firm profits and c is the tax credit rate on
R&D investment11, pt is the price of output at time t and p
K
t is the input price.
Substituting the constraint in the firm’s objective function, we obtain the following
first order condition, yielding that the marginal product of R&D capital is equal to its
user cost and pinning down the optimal level of R&D capital:
∂Vt
∂Kt
= (1− τ)[ptF ′(Kt)− pKt ] + cpKt + βt+1Et
[
(1− τ)pKt+1 − cpKt+1
]
(5)
F ′(Kt) =
pKt (1− τ − c)
pt(1− τ) (1− βt+1Et
pKt+1
pKt
) (6)
K∗t =
(
1
Aα
pKt
pt
(1− τ − c)
(1− τ)
[
1− βt+1Etp
K
t+1
pKt
]) 1
α−1
, (7)
11In the UK, as explained in later sections, the tax incentives for SMEs have been in the form of
deductions rather than credits, but accounting for this fact using an equivalent rate of deduction in place
of a credit does not alter the results expressed in this section.
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where we denote κ ≡ 1
A
pKt
pt
1
(1−τ)
[
1− βt+1Et p
K
t+1
pKt
]
.12
The response of R&D capital to an increase in the generosity of tax credits is therefore
captured by:
∂K∗t
∂c
=
(
1
1− α
)(κ
α
) 1
α−1
(1− τ − c) 1α−1−1 (8)
Equation 8 shows that firms respond to reductions in their user cost via tax incentives
by increasing their R&D capital, as this partial derivative is always positive. In the
empirical section, we use the flow variable for R&D instead of generating a conceptual
‘R&D capital stock’. Given a short time series, the steady state assumption commonly
used in the literature to initialise the R&D capital of the firm (in the spirit of Griliches
(1979) and reviewed in Hall et al. (2009)) renders the R&D capital stock to be proportional
to the flow measure. Hall and Mairesse (1995) present a comparison of R&D flow and
stock variables in the context of estimating production functions and demonstrate that
the results do not change between estimates that use stock and flow measures.
4 Description of the datasets
We link three datasets to create the panel used in this study: (i) the universe of
UK corporation tax assessments from the HM Revenue and Customs (CT600), (ii) the
comprehensive R&D spending data provided by HMRC Specialist R&D Units, and (iii)
annual company accounts from Bureau van Dijk’s Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME)
Database.
The CT600 dataset includes the population of company tax records and provides infor-
mation on the precise tax position of a company including its taxable profit, loss brought
forward, trading profit and losses, and turnover. We link the CT600 dataset with a sep-
12We note that κ > 0, since βt+1Et
pKt+1
pKt
, following from the definition of the discount factor βt+1 =
1
1+rt+1
where rt+1 is the nominal interest rate, ruling out negative real interest rates in expectation.
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arate R&D spending dataset provided by the HMRC Specialist R&D Units, which form
the micro data basis for the National Statistics publication on the R&D tax relief. The
micro level R&D dataset contains precise information on, for each firm-year, the amount of
R&D tax deductions and cash credits claimed and whether the company claimed under the
SME scheme or the large company scheme. For SMEs, there is additional information on
whether they claimed cash or carried losses forward and the total amount of subcontracted
R&D for an SME.
The key advantage of using the R&D spending dataset is that it allows us to observe
precisely the amount of qualifying R&D spending and the status of the company regarding
whether it qualifies as an SME or large company for the purpose of the R&D tax relief.
We complement the administrative tax records with company accounts in FAME to ob-
tain additional information on company age and ownership structure. The final dataset
covers years between 2002 and 2011 and includes 30,056 firm-years for companies that
have undertaken some positive qualifying R&D spending both before and after the 2008
reform.13 According to the HMRC Corporate Intangibles and R&D (CIRD) Manual, there
are three main categories of qualifying expenditures that are eligible to claim the R&D
tax relief. These include staffing costs, consumables (such as water and electricity) and
software directly used in R&D.
According to the ONS estimates, the total current R&D spending by all UK businesses
amounted to around £13.7 billion in 2005 and subsequently increased to around £17.4
billion in 2011 (in nominal terms). The ratio of total qualifying R&D spending that is
observed in HMRC data to the aggregate current spending in BERD published by the
13We use the total qualfying R&D spending numbers provided in the R&D micro datasets that are
linked to the CT600. Calculation of qualifying R&D for each company was provided by the HMRC R&D
statistics team. Combining information on enhanced R&D expenditure, total amount of subcontracted
R&D and whether the company is SME or large, we are also able to back out the total qualifying R&D
spending of each company in a given year. Specifically, we scale down the total annual R&D enhanced
expenditure for a company by the deduction rate in the corresponding year, in line with the HMRC
calculations (See Research and Development Tax Relief Statistics published by the HMRC). For example,
an SME that reports £30,000 of enhanced deduction and £25,000 of SME claim under the large company
scheme as sub-contractor before the 2008 rate changes must have undertaken a total qualifying R&D of
£30,000∗(100/150)+£25,000∗(100/125) =£40,000.
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ONS has risen from just over 50 percent to 70 percent between 2005 and 2011. Over the
same period, the number of beneficiary companies from R&D tax incentives increased from
6,120 to 12,050, manifesting the increased take up of the policy. We do not expect our
results to be affected by this increase in take up, as our experiments focus on companies
that have already been benefiting from the scheme both before and after the 2008 reforms.
5 Empirical approach
Throughout our sample period, the tax component of the user cost of R&D capital
was roughly stable for large companies that exceeded both the pre-2008 and post-2008
thresholds for what defines an SME (Figure 3). The group of large companies therefore
constitutes a natural control group to benchmark treated firms’ behaviour. A company is
included in the control group if it carried out qualifying R&D in at least one of the years
before 2008, and also in at least one of the years after 2008, and (i) is labeled as large in
the last of such pre-reform years with positive R&D and, (ii) is also labeled as large in the
first of such post-reform years with positive R&D.14 This approach therefore addresses an
intensive margin question, estimating the policy effect for companies which were already
performing qualifying R&D in the pre-reform period.15
5.1 Treatment I: Large companies that were reclassified as SME
after 2008
The first policy reform that we exploit is based on the change in the size thresholds for
defining an SME, which allows us to compare R&D spending in firms which became eligible
to benefit from the more generous SME benefits. These companies therefore enjoyed
14We do not take the 2008 status into account, since the size definition change was introduced in August
2008, which is in the middle of the tax year.
15Note that the diff-in-diff approach does not allow us to address the responsiveness of R&D spending
at the extensive margin. This is because we do not know the companies’ SME or large statuses unless
they are already spending in R&D.
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enhanced deductions of up to £175 for every £100 spent in R&D in the post-reform
period. In comparison, companies that remained to be classified as large saw an enhanced
deduction of £130 for every £100 of R&D spending. In our main analysis, we define a
company as ‘treated’ if it carried out qualifying R&D in at least one of the years before
2008, and also in at least one of the years after 2008, and (i) is labeled as ‘large’ in the
last of such pre-reform years with positive R&D and, (ii) is labeled as ‘SME’ in the first
of such post-reform years with positive R&D. We call this group of treated firms as the
group of ‘medium sized companies’.
If many firms are in a loss-making position, or if they are in different tax brackets,
then the value of the differential change in the enhanced deduction may vary across the
groups, and this could mask the identifying variation in the user cost generated by the
policy reform. To rule out this possibility, we calculate for each company-year observation
a measure of the user cost of R&D capital to assess whether variation in the tax component
of the user cost of capital indeed resembles the pattern depicted in Figure 3. Figure 4
verifies the identifying variation in the tax component of the user cost triggered by the
SME definition change in 2008. On average, medium-sized (treated) firms experienced a
decline in their tax component of the cost of capital from 0.92 in the pre-treatment period
to 0.76 in the post-treatment period, whereas that of the large group remained at 0.94
throughout the sample period.
The dataset for analysing the 2008 SME definition change is an unbalanced sample
that includes 185 firms in the treated group and 1,102 firms in the control group. Each
firm is observed over multiple periods, and at least once before the reform and at least
once afterwards. Sample sizes are different for the two groups, and we later use matching
techniques to achieve two groups of similar sizes with similar characteristics to verify the
results that we obtained using the full sample.
The broad sectoral distribution of companies is very similar across treated and control
groups, with 50 to 60 percent of the companies in manufacturing sectors on average16.
16Note that since we do not have any information on the breakdown of these companies’ fields of research
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Figure 4: Average user cost of capital across treatment and control groups, tax component
In the treatment and control groups of interest, the majority of companies in the service
sector belong to the two-digit SIC (2003) categories of either ‘research and development
(73)’ or ‘computer and related activities (72)’. Companies in these service sector cate-
gories mainly engage in research and development and produce intellectual property or
contractual arrangements with other companies that purchase their R&D services as final
outputs.
Figure 5 presents average firm spending in R&D by treatment and control groups.
Graphically, there is no particular pattern that suggests violation of the common trends
assumption in the levels of R&D. We formally test the 2005 increase depicted in Figure 5
for the treated group and show that there were no significant differential increases for the
treated group in any period before the reform (Tables 11 and 12).
5.2 Treatment II: SMEs that remained as SMEs after 2008
We form an alternative treated group, which constitutes the group of firms that re-
mained as SMEs after the 2008 definition change and throughout the sample period, to
and development activity, we can comment only on the sector of their final product.
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Figure 5: Average R&D spending across groups, values in real (2009) thousand GBP
analyse the effect of an increase in enhanced deduction rates on R&D spending. We name
the group of treated firms under this second experiment as the group of ‘small companies’
to avoid confusion with the first experiment, which involves medium-sized firms. Com-
panies in this treated group are smaller compared to the firms that ‘became’ SME as a
result of the SME definition change, but focusing on the set of small companies yields a
much larger sample than in the previous section, allowing us to both evaluate the change
in deduction rates in isolation and to examine the impact of the policy reform on other
outcomes than R&D spending such as investment and non-R&D costs17. We provide
the results of placebo tests to verify that this sample also satisfies the common trends
assumption for identification in a diff-in-diff setup (Table 12).
The policy experiment summarised in this section is of interest, as it compares the
large companies whose tax component of user cost remained at 0.94, to SMEs whose tax
component of user cost dropped from around 0.82 to 0.75. Before we move on to discussing
the regression results in Section 6, we demonstrate the trends in mean R&D spending for
17These variables are available for about half the sample. The larger sample size in this section also
allows us to remove any firms which experienced large jumps in their turnover growth rates in the data
cleaning procedure. The sample size of the control group is therefore smaller in this sample than the one
used in Section 5.1. Using the same control group in Section 5.1 does not alter our results.
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the group of large companies and the group of SMEs, in order to establish the group trends
in R&D spending in the pre- and post-reform periods for these two groups.
Figure 6: Average R&D spending across groups, values in real (2009) thousand GBP
We provide descriptive statistics for each of the samples described in Tables 13 and 14.
5.3 Estimation strategy
Following the conceptual framework presented in Section 3, we attribute the interaction
term on our difference-in-difference specification to be capturing the reduction in the user
cost of R&D for the treated group of companies in the following model where we identify
the causal effect of the 2008 reform on R&D spending:
E[Rit|Dit,xit] = exp(γ + δDDi + δIDiTt + x′itβx + φt + νit), (9)
where Rit is the level of qualifying R&D spending for company i in year t in 2009 prices.
Di is a dummy that takes on a value of 1 for the treated observations and 0 for the
control observations. Tt is a dummy that takes on a value of 1 for years 2008 onwards
and 0 otherwise. The coefficient δI on the interaction term DiTt captures the differential
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change in qualifying R&D spending between pre- and post-2008 periods for the treatment
group compared to the control group. The null hypothesis of no impact of the change in
the generosity of the tax relief on R&D spending in the treated group relative to that in
the control group corresponds to δI = 0. Time-invariant unobserved firm heterogeneity is
captured by the inclusion of firm-fixed effects (later in the estimation stage) and aggregate
macroeconomic shocks that are common to all companies, including the effect of the
great recession, are controlled for in all specifications by the set of time fixed effects φt.
Other non-tax determinants of firm-level R&D spending including the firm’s growth rate
of turnover and measures of firm size can be included in the x vector as additional controls.
Companies do not claim tax relief continuously every year. There is anecdotal evidence
on companies which alternate staff functions between R&D and non-R&D ones depending
on the availability of suitable projects.18 In the CT600 dataset, if we consider all the
companies with some R&D spending during the observed period, only 40 percent claim
R&D tax relief continuously in all the years and the remaining ones stop claiming at least
once. We interpret the instances with zero R&D expenditure as failure to meet fixed costs
associated with undertaking qualifying R&D and claiming tax incentives on it.
For variables of interest characterized with a long right-tail and a mass-point at zero,
Silva and Tenreyro (2006) propose a simple Poisson Pseudo-Maximum-Likelihood (PPML)
estimator (following Gourieroux et al. (1984)) to achieve consistency in estimating the
parameters of a log-linear model. In particular, Silva and Tenreyro (2006) demonstrate
that in the log-linear specification, the OLS estimates are severely biased and inconsistent
and that the PPML estimates perform very well on simulated data.19 In the context of
R&D, an application can be found in Agrawal et al. (2014). We use robust standard errors
to correct for over-dispersion.
18This argument was put forward by the HMRC and Treasury teams that participated in the seminar
on 6 November 2014.
19The PPML estimator has been widely used in the empirical international trade literature (see, for
example, Westerlund and Wilhelmsson (2009) and a survey by Gomez-Herrera (2013)).
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Table 2: Baseline results. Treatment: large companies relabelled as SMEs after 2008
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6 Results
6.1 Baseline results: the main experiment
In Table 2, Column (1) presents the baseline specification with no controls, and cap-
tures the mean differences between treatment and control groups. The row labeled ‘Diff-
in-diff’ provides the estimates for the main coefficient of interest which captures the dif-
ferential effect of the policy reform on average R&D spending in the treated group relative
to the counterfactual. The coefficient ‘Treatment’ represents the estimate for the δD pa-
rameter and captures the difference in the average qualifying R&D spending between the
treated and control groups in the absence of treatment. This coefficient is negative and
significant in all columns, suggesting that, on average, companies in the treated group un-
dertook a lower amount of R&D spending than their counterparts in the control group. We
then gradually add control variables, first, instead of the pre-/post-reform dummy, we add
year fixed effects in Column (2), followed by two-digit sector dummies (Column (3)). In
Column (4), we include a firm size proxy, that is the total company revenues in real terms
(lagged), and in Column (5), we add the rate of growth of real revenues (lagged). In all
these regressions, the diff-in-diff coefficient is significant at the 5 percent level, indicating
a differential increase in R&D spending for treated firms of around 39.7 percent. The first
5 columns in the table do not take into account unobserved time invariant firm-specific
characteristics that may be correlated with treatment status. We add firm fixed effects
to the regression from Column (6) onwards. Given that we do not observe substantial
differences between the estimates with and without firm fixed effects (as expected in a
balanced sample setting), we proceed by focusing on the results with firm fixed effects
only.
Next, we test firms’ reaction to the early announcement of the policy. Firms may react
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Table 3: Baseline results. Treatment: large companies relabelled as SMEs after 2008
Removing both 2007 and 2008 fiscal years
[TABLE HERE]
to the announcement of the policy before its implementation by: (i) postponing their R&D
spending to the post-treatment period when it becomes cheaper to do so, (ii) starting to
invest early on in preparation for a long term R&D project, (iii) postponing merger and
acquisition decisions to until after the policy change, or (iv) strategically adjusting the
firm size to keep benefiting from the SME scheme both before and after the policy change.
Given our reduced form approach, it is not possible to disentangle these different factors
at play, but at least we may be able to limit the effect of such strategic behaviour on our
estimates. Removing the years 2007-2008 would address the issues that may arise from
back-loading the R&D investment as in (i), or front-loading the R&D investment as in (ii),
because of the timing of policy announcement. In Table 3, we observe that the coefficient
size in the preferred specification (Column (4)) is 35.5 percent, and significant at the 10
percent level. The estimates are more imprecise, possibly because of the smaller sample
size in comparison to the results presented in Table 2.
If there is a strategic timing issue of mergers and acquisitions as in (iii) above, then
the acquired firm is not captured by either treatment or control groups, since they will
fail to satisfy the intensive margin condition of having been in the dataset and performed
R&D at least once both before and after the reform. Finally, the strategic adjustment of
firm size to always benefit from the more generous SME scheme is the downsizing effect
discussed in Garicano et al. (2013). The predictions in the paper by Garicano et al. (2013)
suggest that some less productive firms may ‘bulge’ just below the threshold for eligibility
to the SME scheme, which means that they will initially keep employment below 250 and
then expand to a larger size, perhaps not as much as 500 employees but possibly to a
larger size than 250. The number of companies that grow just after the announcement
or the implementation of the policy is fewer than the HMRC disclosure threshold of 30
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observations, not allowing us to present an analysis of the behaviour of these companies.
These firms would possibly have remained as SMEs both before and after the reform,
ruling them out as treated or control group in our first experiment. To ensure that our
results are robust to potential bunching of firms below the employment threshold of 250,
we exclude firms with employment between 240 and 260 in the treated and control groups
and repeat the diff-in-diff regressions. The basic findings remain unchanged. Using a wider
exclusion band (employment between 230 and 270) also yields similar results.
We check the validity of the common trends assumption by implementing placebo
reforms in each of the pre-reform years in our sample, namely, all the years over 2003-
2007. We do not find any impact of the policy in these periods, and the results are
presented in Table 11.
Finally, we explore the implications of selecting a control group based on observable
characteristics, addressing at the same time the issue that the control group sample size is
larger than that of the treated group. We first employ a Mahalanobis distance matching
procedure to pair control group companies with each treatment group firm on their pre-
reform period characteristics and run the diff-in-diff specifications as explained earlier in
this section. For the matching procedure, we use closeness between treated and control
observations in their pre-reform period means of profit margin (net trading profit as a
share of turnover), fixed assets (real) and turnover growth rate20. We use these covariates
because they are separate from the criteria used to determine eligibility to treatment and
they are available for a large set of the observations in our sample. We obtain bootstrapped
standard errors through 100 replications of this procedure. Based on the results with the
preferred specification with all control variables and firm and year fixed effects, the PPML
estimator yields a diff-in-diff coefficient of around 54 percent and statistically significant
at 5 percent level. This point estimate is larger than that found using the full sample, but
with overlapping confidence intervals.
20Software package used for this purpose is Stata’s user-written ‘mahapick’ command written by David
Kantor (Kantor (2006)).
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6.2 Heterogeneous responses across firms
Anecdotal evidence suggests that there is a degree of heterogeneity in firm responses to
R&D tax incentives. We explore various dimensions of possible heterogeneity, such as com-
panies that have continuous positive R&D spending as opposed to those that ‘stop-and-go’,
loss-making versus profitable firms, as well as differences across firm growth quartiles based
on average growth in the pre-treatment period and firm age quartiles. The specification
used for each of these dimensions of possible heterogeneity takes the following general
form:
E[Rit|Dit,xit] = exp(γ + δDDi + δTTt + δIDiTt + δHDDiHi + δHT TtHi + δHI DiTtHi
+x′itβx + νit)
(10)
In the specification in Equation 10 each of the key variables ‘Treatment’, ‘Post2009’
and ‘Diff-in-diff’ are interacted with the chosen dimension of heterogeneity, captured by
the dummy variable H. More specifically, in each of the four different regressions (i)-(iv),
H is a variable that takes a value of unity if the company: (i) performs strictly positive
R&D in all years after it started reporting any R&D and zero otherwise, (ii) reports a
trading loss in each of the periods 2005, 2006 and 2007 and zero otherwise, (iii) is in
the highest growth quartile based on turnover growth averages in the pre-reform period
and zero otherwise, (iv) is in the lowest age quartile (young firm) and zero otherwise.
For example, in (i) therefore, the variables that are uninteracted with H capture the
coefficients for the companies that are intermittent in their R&D spending, and then the
coefficients that are interacted with H capture the surplus for the consistent performers of
R&D over intermittent performers of R&D. The triple interaction term DiTtHi captures
the differential effect of the policy reform for the firms that are in the group of consistent
performers of R&D relative to the intermittent performers of R&D, and δHI .
Perhaps surprisingly, none of these distinctions offer significant differential effects of
one group over another, except the group of young firms. One reason may be that the
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Table 4: Baseline results. Treatment: SMEs that remained as SMEs after 2008
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sample sizes are not large enough to offer sufficient power to detect any differential impact
within these sub-groups under the treated group companies. The regression results can
be found for these separate groups in Tables 8, 9 and 10. We find that younger firms,
identified as the bottom quartile across the firm age distribution is responding to the policy
change differentially more. The results based on the age dimension are presented in Table
10 in the relevant appendix. We explore this breakdown further in the sample with small
companies as the treated group (Section 6.3), but we do not find a similar differential
effect of the policy on younger firms and therefore refrain from drawing conclusions based
on this result.
6.3 Findings from the rate-increase experiment
In this section we present findings on the effect of the second experiment with ‘small-
companies’ as the treated group. Table 4 summarises the regression results, following the
same specification as used for regressions presented in Table 2. Specifically, Column (1)
presents results of the baseline specification with no controls. The diff-in-diff coefficient
captures the mean differences in R&D spending between treatment and control groups as
a result of the reform and is estimated to be positive and highly significant.
We check the robustness of this finding by adding year fixed effects in Column (2),
two-digit sector dummies in Column (3), controlling for firm size by including lagged real
revenues in Column (4), and adding growth rate of lagged real revenues in Column (5).
In all these regressions, the diff-in-diff coefficient estimate remains positive and significant
at the 5 percent level. We further check the robustness of this finding by controlling for
unobserved time invariant firm-specific characteristics using firm fixed effects in regressions
in Columns (5)-(9). The basic findings remain unchanged. The diff-in-diff coefficient
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Table 5: Baseline results. Treatment: SMEs that remained SMEs after 2008
Removing both 2007 and 2008 fiscal years
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estimate in the preferred specification in Column (9) suggests that on average, the 2008
reform increased the qualifying R&D spending by the treated group of consistent SMEs
by 16.4 percent relative to that by the control group of large companies.
Regression results in Table 5 check the sensitivity of the basic findings to any potential
anticipation effect of firms in response to the early announcement of the policy. Following
the same specifications as in Table 4, removing observations in years 2007 and 2008 yields
similar results. The point estimate of the diff-in-diff coefficient in Column (9) increases
slightly to 0.197 and remains significant at the 5 percent level.
Our main results are aligned with those that were obtained when we exploited the
policy reform related to the SME definition change. The advantage of this alternative
experiment is the large sample size for both the treated and control groups, which allows
us to explore the effects of the policy on different outcome variables than R&D spending.
The literature on R&D tax incentives discusses the ‘relabelling problem’, which refers to
companies having an incentive to reclassify ordinary spending as R&D to benefit from the
preferential tax treatment (See, for example, Griffith et al. (1995)). To assess the extent of
the relabelling problem in the dataset, we analyse whether there is any systematic change
in qualifying expenditure for regular capital investment and non-R&D expenses. In the
presence of relabelling, we may expect a negative and significant effect of tax incentives
on these variables.
Table 6 summarises the regression results, where Columns (1) and (3) present the diff-
in-diff coefficient estimates using qualifying investment expenditure and the ratio of non-
R&D input costs in turnover as the outcome variable, respectively. In both columns, the
coefficient estimate of the interaction term is negative and insignificant, not suggesting any
sign of relabelling of regular investment expenditure or non-R&D input costs to maximise
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Table 6: Effect of policy on other outcomes than R&D
Treatment: SMEs that remained as SMEs after 2008
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tax savings. Even if we interpret the negative, albeit insignificant, coefficient on physical
investment as an indication of some relabelling, we would expect to observe a larger degree
of relabelling in the non-R&D costs, which is not present in our data. The evidence is
consistent with Hall (1995), who shows that government auditors (in the US and Australia)
do not find much abuse of the R&D tax incentives.
Column (2) presents the magnitude of the effect on R&D spending using a comparable
sample for benchmarking, which ensures that findings related to investment expenditure
is not an artefact of changes in the regression sample.
6.4 Interpreting the results
The availability of the rate change experiment allows us to disentangle the effect of the
increase in the enhanced deduction rate from the broader set of benefits brought about by
the SME definition change.
The SME definition change encompasses the rate reduction that applies to the SMEs,
and a further rate reduction thanks to the firms’ switch from being considered as ‘large’
to being considered as ‘SME’. In this context, the 39.7 percent increase in qualifying R&D
spending in response to around an average 17 percent drop in the tax component of the
user cost translates to an estimate for the elasticity of R&D with respect to its user cost
of around -2.34. This is a sizeable effect of the policy, which is on the higher end of the
estimates found in the literature. It is, on the other hand, in line with the findings from a
recent HMRC evaluation (Fowkes et al. (2015)). In addition, given the cost of the policy
in the form of foregone tax revenue, we find that each £1 foregone in corporation tax
generates around £1.6 in R&D for taxpayers at the small profits rate (21 percent in the
post-reform period) and around £1.2 in R&D for taxpayers at the main rate (28 percent
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in 2008-2010).21
The diff-in-diff coefficient estimate in the alternative experiment captures the rate
change in isolation, as companies in the treated group remain as SMEs throughout the
sample period and are not affected by the definition change. Our preferred estimate for
the rate-change experiment suggests that on average, there is a 16.4 percent increase in
qualifying R&D spending by SMEs in response to 9 percent drop in the tax component
of the user cost. The results from the rate-change experiment suggests an R&D user
cost elasticity estimate of around -1.82, which is comparable to the user cost elasticity
estimated from the main experiment. In terms of the bang-for-the-buck calculation based
on these estimates, the findings are roughly the same as in the policy experiment with the
SME definition change. For main rate taxpayers, the bang-for-the-buck is calculated as
£1.1 and for the small profits taxpayers, we find that an additional £1.5 was generated
per £1 foregone in corporation tax revenue.
6.5 Comparing the diff-in-diff results with direct estimates of
user cost elasticity
Finally, as a robustness check, we explore whether the interaction term captures suffi-
cient variation in the user cost of R&D by replacing it with a measure of the actual cost
of capital for R&D in Equation 9. We compute the R&D user cost as described in Section
2, where the statutory marginal tax rate is firm specific and depends on the current-year
taxable profit.
The user cost of R&D capital is now the ‘continuous treatment’ variable of interest,
21We calculate the foregone corporation tax revenue by multiplying the corporation tax rate by the
change in taxable profit triggered by the change in R&D enhanced deduction rates. For example, for a
fixed amount of revenues net of other expenses than R&D (say, an amount X), treated firms experience
changes in the enhanced deduction rate 1+d, and R&D spending level R, the taxable profit is X−R(1+d).
The difference between the counterfactual scenario and the post-reform rates go through R and 1 + d,
where in the post-reform state, R increases to 1.397R and 1 + d increases from 1.25 to 1.75. At the small
profits tax rate of 0.21, the foregone tax revenue per firm is then calculated as 0.251R, and at the main
rate of 0.28, this value is 0.334R. Dividing the average additional R&D generated by the policy of 0.397R
by the foregone tax revenue, we obtain the bang-for-the-buck estimate of £1.2-1.6.
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which we expect to affect the level of R&D capital within a firm negatively. The relevant
sample for estimating the elasticity of R&D spending with respect to its user cost pools
all the observations used in both experiments of interest for this study.
The amount of R&D spending brings down the current-year taxable profit and marginal
tax rate, therefore, the user cost is endogenous to the level of R&D spending. In a
regression with R&D spending as the dependent variable and the user cost of R&D capital
as explanatory variable, we expect this simultaneity to bias the coefficient on the user cost
variable towards zero. In contrast, in our calculation of the user cost variable, we assume
that the marginal tax rate for loss-making companies which do not receive cash is zero.
This approach is likely to understate the value of the tax incentives for loss-making firms
that can carryforward the tax savings to offset future tax liability, potentially causing the
magnitude of the coefficient on the user cost to be overestimated (biased away from zero).
The net effect (bias) of the two countervailing forces that we discussed in this section is
ambiguous, and we use two approaches to address endogeneity issues. As a first attempt,
we construct a measure of the R&D user cost, using the marginal tax rate based on the
previous years taxable profit. Second, we use a ‘before-R&D spending’ marginal tax rate
based on companies’ taxable profits before undertaking any qualifying R&D investment
to construct an alternative R&D user cost of capital measure.
Table 7 presents the results from the regressions with the R&D user cost of capital as
an explanatory variable. We include year fixed effects, firm fixed effects, companies’ real
turnover (lagged), and the real growth rate of turnover (lagged) as controls. In Column
(1), the explanatory variable of interest is the the user cost variable calculated as described
in Section 2. The magnitude of the estimated coefficient on the user cost is -2.36, with
large standard errors. In Column (2), we replace the actual user cost with the user cost
measure calculated based on previous-year marginal tax rate. The magnitude and the
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significance of the coefficient estimate change only slightly. In Column (3), we replace the
user cost variable with one based on ‘before-R&D spending’ marginal tax rate, and we
focus on the tax component of this measure. This modification results in a reduction in
the size and standard errors of our user cost elasticity estimates. The findings are in line
with our results from the diff-in-diff analysis.
7 Conclusion
R&D and innovation policy started to increasingly rely on indirect incentives to support
business spending in R&D. There has been a global surge in tax incentive schemes for
R&D, with limited evidence on the effectiveness of such schemes due to lack of data and
problems related to endogeneity in estimation.
In this paper we analyse the effectiveness of tax-based R&D policy in stimulating busi-
ness spending in R&D. We use a novel and rich administrative dataset for the period
2002-2011 on all corporate R&D investors in the United Kingdom, and exploit two ex-
ogenous policy reforms to quantify the impact of R&D tax incentives. Both reforms took
place in 2008. By increasing the generosity of the R&D tax deduction, the two reforms
lowered the user cost of R&D capital for (i) medium-sized companies and (ii) small com-
panies, while keeping the user cost stable for larger firms that remain above the eligibility
threshold to be qualified as a SME for R&D purposes.
Our findings from the analysis of the two policy experiments suggest that the R&D
tax incentives have a strong positive effect on stimulating qualifying R&D spending. In
the first experiment, identification relies on variation in the R&D user cost for the group
of companies that are newly qualified as SMEs following the SME definition change. Our
results suggest that the 17 percent reduction in the R&D user cost increased qualifying
R&D spending by 39.7 percent, suggesting an elasticity estimate of around -2.3 and about
£1.6 of additional R&D generated per pound foregone in corporation tax revenue. In the
second experiment, identification relies on variation in the R&D user cost as a result of
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an increase in the enhanced deduction rate for the group of companies that are consistent
SMEs. The reduction in the R&D user cost due to the second policy reform was, on
average, 9 percent. Our results suggest a differential increase in R&D spending of 16.4
percent for this group, which translates to a R&D user cost elasticity of around -1.8 and a
similar bang-for-the-buck estimate of £1.5 per pound foregone in corporation tax revenue.
The finding of a strong increase in R&D spending in response to more generous R&D
tax incentives is robust to factoring in anticipation effects and controlling for other non-
tax determinants of R&D investment. The strong increase in R&D spending is observed
in both consistent and intermittent spenders, profit and loss-making companies. We show
that the observed increase in R&D spending is not a mere artefact of relabelling ordinary
investment in physical assets.
Due to the short time period in our dataset, we are unable to analyse the link between
R&D spending and long-run productivity growth and R&D spillovers following the policy
change. We leave these important research topics to future study.
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A Tables
Table 1: Marginal Corporation Tax Rate in the UK (percent), 2002-2014
Taxable Profit (£) 2002-2005 2006 2007 2008-2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
0-10,000* 0 19 20 21 21 21 21 21
10,001-50,000 23.75 19 20 21 21 21 21 21
50,001-300,000 19 19 20 21 21 21 21 21
300,001-1,500,000 32.75 32.75 32.5 29.75 27.25 24.75 23.5 21
Above 1,500,000 30 30 30 28 26 24 23 21
*Between 2004 and 2005, the zero marginal tax rate was only available
to profits retained within the company. For profits distributed as dividends,
the marginal tax rate is 19%.
31
Table 2
Baseline results. Treatment: large companies relabelled as SMEs after 2008
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Treatment -1.815*** -1.825*** -1.707*** -1.428*** -1.408***
(0.286) (0.286) (0.333) (0.257) (0.251)
Diff in diff 0.326* 0.335* 0.332* 0.443** 0.423* 0.400** 0.420** 0.397** 0.397**
(0.191) (0.191) (0.194) (0.214) (0.219) (0.192) (0.186) (0.185) (0.185)
Post 2008 0.158** 0.221***
(0.076) (0.067)
Revenues 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(£’000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Revenue growth 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
Year fixed effects? No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects? No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector fixed effects? No No Yes Yes Yes No No No No
N 10,106 10,106 10,106 10,106 10,106 10,106 10,106 10,106 10,106
Robust standard errors in all regressions
First lags of real revenue and real revenue growth rate
* significance at 10 %, ** significance at 5 %, *** significance at 1 %
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Table 3
Baseline results. Treatment: large companies relabelled as SMEs after 2008
Removing both 2007 and 2008 fiscal years
1 2 3 4
Diff in diff 0.361* 0.381** 0.355* 0.355*
(0.186) (0.182) (0.182) (0.182)
Post 2008 0.278***
(0.075)
Revenues 0.000*** 0.000***
(£’000) (0.000) (0.000)
Revenue growth 0.000***
(0.000)
Year fixed effects? No Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 8,926 8,926 8,926 8,926
Same remarks as in Table 2
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Table 4
Baseline results
Treatment: SMEs that remained SMEs (rate increase experiment)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Treatment -3.632*** -3.643*** -3.431*** -3.167*** -3.153***
(0.217) (0.216) (0.184) (0.161) (0.159)
Diff in Diff 0.245*** 0.256*** 0.247** 0.400*** 0.385*** 0.179** 0.193** 0.164** 0.164**
(0.095) (0.094) (0.096) (0.146) (0.143) (0.086) (0.083) (0.082) (0.082)
Post 2008 0.143* 0.219***
(0.085) (0.076)
Revenues 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000
(£’000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Revenue growth -0.389** -0.049
(0.179) (0.148)
Year fixed effects? No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects? No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector fixed effects? No No Yes Yes Yes No No No No
N 25,448 25,448 25,448 25,448 25,448 25,448 25,448 25,448 25,448
Same remarks as in Table 2
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Table 5
Baseline results
Treatment: SMEs that remained SMEs (rate increase experiment)
Removing both 2007 and 2008 fiscal years
1 2 3 4
Diff in diff 0.218** 0.228** 0.197** 0.197**
(0.098) (0.095) (0.098) (0.098)
Post 2008 0.276***
(0.085)
Revenues 0.000 0.000
(£’000) (0.000) (0.000)
Revenue growth -0.042
(0.153)
Year fixed effects? No Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 22,388 22,388 22,388 22,388
Same remarks as in Table 2
Table 6
Effect of policy on other outcomes than R&D
Treatment: SMEs that remained SMEs (rate increase experiment)
1 2 3 4
Outcome variable: Investment R&D Non-R&D R&D
cost ratio
Diff in Diff -0.128 0.156** -0.030 0.170**
(0.114) (0.084) (0.037) (0.082)
Revenues 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(£’000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Revenue Growth 0.343** -0.048 -0.060* 0.034
(0.147) (0.157) (0.035) (0.148)
Year fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 25,159 25,159 25,405 25,405
Same remarks as in Table 2
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Table 7
Direct estimates of user cost elasticity
1 2 3
R&D CoC based on profit at t -2.361
(1.602)
R&D CoC based on profit at t− 1 -2.395
(1.542)
R&D CoC based on profit at t− 1, exc R&D -1.746**
(Tax component) (0.796)
Revenues -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(£’000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Revenue Growth -0.020 -0.020 -0.011
(0.130) (0.130) (0.127)
Year fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes
N 29,552 29,552 29,552
Same remarks as in Table 2
Table 8: Heterogeneous responses to the policy, consistent performers of R&D
Treatment: large companies reclassified as SMEs after 2008
1 2 3 4
Diff in diff, NC 0.515 0.506 0.44 0.44
(0.337) (0.335) (0.325) (0.325)
Post 2008, NC 0.212
(0.202)
Diff in diff * C -0.282 -0.217 -0.163 -0.163
(0.371) (0.371) (0.359) (0.359)
Post 2008 * C 0.084 0.081 0.031 0.031
(0.216) (0.213) (0.193) (0.193)
Revenues 0.000 0.000
(£’000) (0.000) (0.000)
Revenue growth 0.000
(0.000)
Year fixed effects? No Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 8,926 8,926 8,926 8,926
Same remarks as in Table 2
NC: not consistent performer of R&D, C: consistent performer of R&D
Definition of ‘consistent’: R&D positive in each period after take up
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Table 9: Heterogeneous responses to the policy, consecutive loss-makers
Treatment: large companies reclassified as SMEs after 2008
1 2 3 4
Diff in diff, NL 0.356** 0.407** 0.376** 0.376**
(0.175) (0.176) (0.172) (0.172)
Post 2008, NL 0.322***
(0.094)
Diff in diff * L 0.071 0.012 0.023 0.024
(0.340) (0.334) (0.330) (0.330)
Post 2008 * L -0.133 -0.113 -0.126 -0.126
(0.158) (0.150) (0.141) (0.141)
Revenues 0.000 0.000
(£’000) (0.000) (0.000)
Revenue growth 0.000
(0.000)
Year fixed effects? No Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 8,818 8,818 8,818 8,818
Same remarks as in Table 2
NL: not lossmaking, L: lossmaking
Definition of ‘loss-making’: trading loss in two of 2005, 2006 or 2007
Similar results are obtained if the split is made using companies
which incurred trading loss in all of 2005, 2006 and 2007
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Table 10: Heterogeneous responses to the policy, young firms
Treatment: large companies reclassified as SMEs after 2008
1 2 3 4
Diff in diff, old 0.271 0.279 0.246 0.246
(0.220) (0.219) (0.218) (0.218)
Post 2008, old 0.321***
(0.078)
Diff in diff * Young 0.725** 0.754** 0.789** 0.789**
(0.339) (0.326) (0.327) (0.327)
Post2008 * Young -0.427** -0.327* -0.357* -0.357*
(0.200) (0.197) (0.199) (0.199)
Revenues 0.000 0.000
(£’000) (0.000) (0.000)
Revenue growth 0.000
(0.000)
Year fixed effects? No Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 8,926 8,926 8,926 8,926
Same remarks as in Table 2
Definition for ‘young’: in 2007, bottom quartile in the age distribution
Table 11: Placebo reforms
Treatment: large companies reclassified as SMEs after 2008
Placebo reform year 2004 2005 2006 2007
Diff in diff -0.022 0.276 -0.038 0.088
(0.350) (0.279) (0.197) (0.154)
Revenues 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(£’000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Revenue growth 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year fixed effects? No Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 11,298 11,298 11,298 11,298
Same remarks as in Table 2
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Table 12: Placebo reforms
Treatment: SMEs that remained as SMEs after 2008
Placebo reform year 2004 2005 2006 2007
Diff in diff -0.051 0.066 0.103 0.134
(0.131) (0.115) (0.105) (0.095)
Revenues 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(£’000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Revenue growth -0.030 -0.030 -0.030 -0.031
(0.130) (0.130) (0.130) (0.130)
Year fixed effects? No Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 28,549 28,549 28,549 28,549
Same remarks as in Table 2
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Table 13: Sample characteristics
Panel A: Main sample
Share of CoC R&D Spend. R&D Spend. Turnover Turnover
Year Group N Loss-making Mean Mean Median Mean Median
2002-03 Medium-sized Companies 118 33% 0.306 553 0 29,505 11,639
2003-04 Medium-sized Companies 127 33% 0.318 737 0 37,722 11,716
2004-05 Medium-sized Companies 135 33% 0.317 522 94 35,411 12,994
2005-06 Medium-sized Companies 146 33% 0.313 1,496 110 32,931 12,543
2006-07 Medium-sized Companies 151 40% 0.321 826 164 32,827 10,349
2007-08 Medium-sized Companies 155 46% 0.335 881 210 35,929 12,156
2008-09 Medium-sized Companies 164 45% 0.301 710 196 34,409 11,527
2009-10 Medium-sized Companies 171 46% 0.263 738 171 34,297 9,816
2010-11 Medium-sized Companies 173 45% 0.269 1,995 222 33,657 9,960
2011-12 Medium-sized Companies 167 44% 0.269 1,406 248 35,024 9,742
2002-03 Large Control 866 31% 0.321 2,517 0 213,082 28,934
2003-04 Large Control 904 30% 0.323 4,868 94 240,191 29,753
2004-05 Large Control 945 32% 0.327 5,465 178 239,664 29,788
2005-06 Large Control 962 31% 0.327 5,692 220 263,846 31,685
2006-07 Large Control 980 32% 0.327 6,043 385 273,558 34,789
2007-08 Large Control 1008 35% 0.332 6,462 574 256,605 34,855
2008-09 Large Control 1028 37% 0.329 7,334 587 283,542 34,380
2009-10 Large Control 1057 37% 0.331 6,048 656 259,651 32,497
2010-11 Large Control 1040 32% 0.327 6,260 612 281,683 34,338
2011-12 Large Control 1001 32% 0.327 6,080 619 308,841 35,297
R&D and turnover values in thousands, real (2008) GBP
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Table 14: Sample characteristics
Panel B: Sample for the rate increase experiment
Share of CoC R&D Spend. R&D Spend. Turnover Turnover
Year Group N Loss-making Mean Mean Median Mean Median
2002-03 SME 1,997 33% 0.289 100 100 3,812 1,954
2003-04 SME 2,138 32% 0.290 120 120 3,781 1,936
2004-05 SME 2,263 32% 0.292 128 128 3,859 1,933
2005-06 SME 2,373 34% 0.290 138 138 3,976 1,996
2006-07 SME 2,459 36% 0.285 161 161 4,110 2,041
2007-08 SME 2,533 37% 0.282 203 203 4,358 2,166
2008-09 SME 2,530 38% 0.266 223 223 4,600 2,247
2009-10 SME 2,529 44% 0.265 212 212 4,462 2,172
2010-11 SME 2,467 40% 0.265 214 214 4,680 2,218
2011-12 SME 2,444 42% 0.254 243 243 5,018 2,341
2002-03 Large Control 740 29% 0.330 2,789 0 225,676 28,210
2003-04 Large Control 761 27% 0.330 4,837 83 223,423 29,489
2004-05 Large Control 757 29% 0.330 5,627 176 230,774 30,526
2005-06 Large Control 781 30% 0.332 5,580 196 244,605 32,354
2006-07 Large Control 792 31% 0.330 6,193 359 253,344 34,526
2007-08 Large Control 810 34% 0.331 6,512 552 255,164 34,665
2008-09 Large Control 807 35% 0.330 8,024 587 276,443 35,948
2009-10 Large Control 814 34% 0.330 6,429 631 266,554 35,101
2010-11 Large Control 795 29% 0.329 6,677 585 284,537 36,970
2011-12 Large Control 778 29% 0.332 6,687 564 316,418 38,115
R&D and turnover values in thousands, real (2008) GBP
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B Cash credits for SMEs
From its inception, the SME scheme has featured a cash component for companies
which do not have taxable profits and hence cannot benefit from the enhanced deduction
in the year in which the R&D expenditure has been made. HMRC provides a cash refund
up to 24 percent of the amount of the total R&D spending of the firm in cash, which
is an amount capped by the PAYE or NIC liabilities of the company. If the company
is not cash constrained, it has an incentive to carry forward its losses and use the full
deduction amount in a future period when it becomes profitable, however, a company with
liquidity constraints would choose the cash option which can be claimed immediately. The
calculation of the cash amount changed over time, which is depicted in Figure 7, but the
total amount of cash available to a company was kept at around 24-25 percent of total
R&D spending across periods of different enhanced deduction rates.
Figure 7: Cash Credit Rates for Loss-making R&D Performers
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